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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
M~IIE NUNNELLY, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, ___ _ 
vs. 
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SA V-
INGS AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TION, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Case 
No. 6657 
It is true that neither the Badger case, 94 Utah 97, 
nor the :Markey case, 186 So. 757, was a suit in equity. 
The suit in the Badger case was on the contract; in the 
:Markey case for damages for deceit. But those cases 
illustrate and show the nature of the duties violated 
owing by building and loan association corporation to its 
stockholder. The suit here is to establish contractual 
rights, primarily between the respective plaintiffs and 
the savings and loan association-rights which all the 
defendants in combination have taken part in violating 
by conduct both fraudulent and infamous. 
While under the facts plaintiffs might have elected 
to sue at law for deceit, they have sued to get rescission 
of the transactions which apparently have resulted in 
the loss of their paper or legal title to the certificates. 
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And they show that none of the defendants are in the 
situation of innocent purchasers. See McAllister vs. 
McAllister (N. J.), 184 A. 716. 
While no defendant has cross-appealed or even 
cross-assigned error, counsel argue that there is no cause 
of action stated for that there is no tender or offer to 
do equity in the complaint. 
The authorities cited on this point all approve the 
undisputed doctrine that one who seeks equity must do 
equity, and some of them support the claim that a plain-
tiff upon seeking rescission in equity must make such 
offer in his complaint. The authorities divide on this, 
but no authority requires an offer to restore when there 
was nothing of substantial value received. 
Where the only consideration was unsubstantial, to-
wit: a few meals, no restoration or offer is necessary, 
notwithstanding the Civil Code expressly requires a 
restoration. (Section 1691). Gusette v. Dugan, 60 Cal. 
App. 187, 212 P. 397. 
Our own court has held that in even a pure law 
action for deceit and where no tender or return was 
made of certain Delta Canal Company stock the judg-
Inent would not be reversed if the stock be vres~ently 
restored to the defendant. Stuck v. Delta L. & W. Co., 
63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791. In that case the defendant 
argued that neither the pleadings nor evidence showed 
that plaintiff had surrendered or restored the stock. 
Abstra~ts case No. 3914 Appellant's Reply Brief, 
Page 14 (about middle of bound volume). 
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This is a clear holding that neither a tender before 
suit or in the complaint was a contention percedent to 
plaintiff's action. 
Kelly v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 295, Inerely holds the 
general rule of placing in statu quo before decree of 
rescission. No question of sufficiency of pleading was 
involved. The case at bar seeks rescission in equity and 
is not based on an already accomplished rescission in 
pais. 
Rosenthyne v. ~latthews-McCullock, 51 Utah 38, 
168 P. 957, recognizes the general doctrine but does not 
hold or intimate that a tender must be made in the 
pleadings. 
In re Fox vVest Coast Theatres, 88 Fed. (2d) 212, 
and Gillette v. Oberholtzer, 264 P. 229 (Ida.) recognizes 
the general doctrine but do not say that a tender must 
be made in the pleadings. 
Higgins v. First National Bank (N. J.) 183 A. 197, 
merely holds that an action at law cannot be maintained 
as on a rescission in pais when such rescission had not 
taken place for the reason that plaintiff had not restored 
the consideration. 
J)eLange v. Ogden (Tex.) 106 S.W. (2d) 388 holds 
that a tender of the consideration received must be made 
before rescission is had. No question of pleading or 
tender was involved. 
21 C. J. 400, cited by defendants, cites cases supporting 
their contention; also many cases holding that the max-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
im "he who seeks equity must do equity" is not a rule 
of pleading and that the matter may be taken care of 
in the decree. 
12 C.J.S. 1004 states the rule that restoration gen-
erally must be made as a condition to obtaining rescis-
sion (not as a condition of maintaining the suit), and 
at page 101:1 that by the weight of authority it is not 
necessary before suit, and cites a number of cases to 
the effect that the mere asking for the equitable relief 
is an offer to do equity. 
In the case of Lange v. Geiser, 72 P. 343, the Su-
preme Court of California held on this point that if there 
were equitable considerations with respect to restoring 
consideration they should have been presented by answer. 
MULTIFARIOUSNESS 
At pages 6, 7 and 8 counsel assume to state, and 
quite dogmatically, what they consider to be the vari-
ous causes of action stated. They are here but a trifle 
more explicit than they were in stating the grounds of 
their special demurrers. 
Manifestly, their insistence that there is no cause of 
action at all stated is not consistent with their conten-
tion that several causes of action are stated. 
Of course we state or attempt to state a cause of 
action ex contractu and the fact that a fraudulent 
breach of the contractual relation is alleged by no means 
makes the action ex delicto. 
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The fact that rescission of the fraudulent transac-
tion is sought as preliininary to the ultiinate relief, does 
not show a distinet and separate cause of action from 
that involving the plaintiffs' right to be restored on the 
record to their status as stockholders. 
Counsel, we subn1it, are likewise wrong in their 
asslunption that Inatters of receivership and matters of 
accounting, prefuninary in their nature, are distinct and 
several causes of action. See 1 Porn. Eg. (5th Ed.) 146, 
149. 
We ~ubn1it also counsel are likewise wrong in their 
assumption that the allegations and prayer touching the 
Colonial Corporation in the nature of a creditor's suit to 
set aside fraudulent conveyance is a distinct cause of 
action not connected with the same subject of action. 
It is possible that prior to the enactment of Chap. 
42, Laws of 1925, Chap. 1, Title 33, U.C.A., the plaintiffs 
not being judgment creditors, could not have properly 
joined the Colonial Corporation or themselves as co-
plaintiffs with respect to this particular matter, but 
Section~ 33-1-15 and Section 33-1-16 seem to dispense 
with the necessity of first obtaining a judgment against 
the frauduJent grantor, as we pointed out on page 7 of 
our brief. 
But judgment creditors could always join in an 
action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Enright 
v. Gra~t, 5 Utah 334. And it is immaterial whether the 
plaintiff be a technical creditor. 
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In Bump on Fraudulent Conveyances, 3d Edition, 
502-3, it is said, "the statute by the words 'creditors and 
others' embraces others than those who are strictly and 
technically creditors. Even the word 'creditor' does not 
receive a strict definition, for a party who is not strictly 
such a creditor may stand in the equity of a creditor 
and have an interest which may be defrauded. The 
statute protects all just and lawful actions, suits and 
debts, accounts, damages, penalties and forfeitures, and 
consequently all persons having such interests must be 
included in the phrase 'creditors and others,' which 
extends to every person having a legal demand against 
another, whether the demand is one standing in dam-
ages or arising under a contract. The character of the 
claim is, if it is just and lawful, immaterial." 
Our statute defines the term creditor as "a person 
having any claim whether matured or unmatured, liqui-
dated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent.'' 
Sec. 33-1-1. 
And as to joinder of plaintiffs, it has always been 
held that creditors with distinct claims could join in a 
suit to set aside a fradulent conveyance or a part could 
maintain in class suit. 15 C.J. 1413, citing many cases, 
including the Enright case. 
Respondents rely strongly on U.C.A. 104-3-16, and 
they emphasize certain matters under subdivision 7 of 
the section. As to the causes of action joinable it is said 
that they must all belong to one of the specified classes 
and ''must affect all the parties to the action.'' Now, 
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the first subdivision pennits a joinder of causes of 
action where they all arise out of either ''the same 
trans~ction or transacti.ons connected wi.th the sam·e sub-
ject of action.'' Under the allegations each and every 
transaction is connected with the principal matter and 
subject of this suit, nmnely, the establishing of the rela-
tions between appellants and the two defendants cor-
porations. The statute does not say that the parties 
must be affected in the san~e rnanner or in the same 
degree. 
Counsel cite Creer, et al., v. Irrigation Co. (Idaho}, 
90 P. 228, a plain case of misjoinder of fourteen plain-
tiffs having separate contracts where there was no com-
mon point or community of interest in the several 
plaintiffs. 
The mere suggestion that the case is in point with 
the case at bar is indicative or tt want of or failure to 
exercise the slightest power of analysis. 
Counsel cite Lockhart v. Christian, et al. (N. M.) 29 
P. 490, and quote therefrom words holding the statute 
is clear and where there are two causes of action or 
more each must affect all the parties. This recalls Don 
Quixote and his attack on the windmills. We do not dis-
pute the principle of law claimed, but the facts were 
that in the same action the plaintiff there sued C for 
one matter and sued S for another matter, no allega-
tion nor claim that C was connected in any wise with the 
S matter or that S was in any wise connected with the 
C matter. 
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Counsel cite Hollad, etc. Co. v. Holland, 220 P. 1044 
(Kan.). There was no community of interest among the 
plaintiffs. The action· was simply to recover damages 
at law for false representations and the fact that iden-
tical misrepresentations had been made to each of the 
plaintiffs was very properly held not to consitute any 
tie among the plaintiffs. 
Harmon and Co. v. Eastern etc. Co. (Wash. 255, 
P. 964, is cited and quoted from. There a single plain-
tiff sued one corporation on one contract and a different 
corporation on another, a very simple case, and the court 
held that the defendants were not alleged to have any 
connection with each other and the causes of action 
against the several defendants were distinct, which they 
were. 
The next two cases cited are similarly not in point 
here. 
Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Investment Co., et 
al, 50 Utah 363, 167 P. 835, also is cited. In that case 
there was a single plaintiff. As the court held in that 
case, the causes of action were entirely distinct, one 
being against the defendant corporation for a breach of 
contract and the other being against individual defend-
ants alone for the conversion of a trust fund. We sub-
mit one must have a very fantastic and fertile imagin-
ation to see any matter of analogy between that case 
and the one at bar. 
Crummer v. Wilson, et al. (Kan.) 237, P. 1035, is 
cited. There a single plaintiff sued Wilson and his 
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official sureties for certain wrongs done by Wilson in 
his official capacity. In the smne action he sued for 
wrongs done by 'Vilson in his individual capacity. The 
court held that there was a 1nisjoinder. There clearly 
was such, both of causes of action and defendants. 
Neither is the Jordan case, 75 Fed. (2d), 447, at all 
apposite. 
In Han1ilton v. En1pire, etc. Co., 297 Fed. 422, indi-
vidual defendants were joined with a corporation. The 
court held that there was no cause ~of ~action stat~ed 
against the individuals and hence that joining them did 
not prevent the corporation from removing the cause 
from the State court to the Federal court. 
The case of Walser v. Moran (Nev.) 173, P. 1149~ 
is cited without comment. We fail to see any apposite-
ness of that case. However, it is to be noted that the 
governing practice act there did not have in substance 
or effect a provision similar to subdivision 1 of our 
Section 104-3-16. 
Counsel cite Lile v. Kefauver (Ky.) 51 S.W. (2d) 
473. In that case several bank depositors sued the direc-
tors of the bank for having paid dividends while the bank 
was nisolvent. There was no claim made that there was 
any community of interest in the plaintiffs in any trust 
fund or that defendants were involvent or that there 
was any necessity to prorate any losses. The court 
treated the case as being on its facts identical in prin-
ciple with and ruled by the case of Bateman v. Louisville 
Gas Co., 187 Ky. 559, 220 S.W. 318, in which case plain-
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tiff sought to maintain a class suit on behalf of a large 
number of overcharged gas consumers. That case held 
because ''the only relief asked was separate money judg-
ments." (Italics supplied.) We do not find that the court 
in the Lile case discussed the duties in the Duke case 
cited by us. However, there is a good deal of incon-
sistency, apparently, in the Kentucky decisions in cases 
involving several plaintiffs in actions at law. 
Miller v. Ariz. Bank, 43 P. (2d) 518 (Ariz.), 1s 
cited. In that.case it was sought to join several plain-
tiffs in a suit for frauds and the only claim community 
of interest in the plaintiffs lay in the fact that similar 
frauds were practiced on the several plaintiffs. There 
was no question of prorating the recovery or anything 
similar to the various ties that appear in the case at bar. 
In that case the court noted there is a great diver-
sity of decision and it expressed regret that it felt con-
strained to hold as it did. 
In the California case cited in the last case and by 
counsel here, Noroian v. Bennett (Cal.) 179, P. 158, 
twenty separate plaintiffs sought to join in a suit to 
cancel their promissory notes given to the defendant 
where the only ground of cancellation was that each 
plaintiff had been separately induced to give his note 
by fraudulent representations. There was no other as-
serted matter showing a community of interest. The 
court held and contrary to many good authorities that 
they could not be so joined. 
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On page 16 of the brief counsel cite what they imply 
i~ a later rase fr01n the smne court deciding Whiting v. 
Elmira Industrial Association, 61 N.Y.S. 27, namely 
Brown Y. \r erblin, 2-!-! N.Y.S. 209. The case is later but 
it is not fnnn the smne court. It is a case at nisi prius 
and is not silnilar, as rounsel say, to the case at bar. 
There was in fact no trust fund in existence in which 
the various plaintiffs had an interest. The action was 
in tort to recover dan1ages for deceit. It merely appeared 
that there was a siinilarity in the causes of action. The 
court held that the legal remedy was adequate. 
Th~ note to 114 A.L.R. 1015 is quoted from. That 
note deals with the question of simple representative 
suits based primarily upon deceit. Of course it is true 
that where the primary relief sought is damages for 
deceit there can usually be no joinder of plaintiffs and 
usually a class suit may not be maintained. It takes 
something more. There must be a community of interest 
in the relief sought and such appears in many ways in 
the case at bar. 
The note cites Waterman Title Guaranty and Trust 
Company, 293 N.Y.S. 168, where the plaintiff sought to 
maintain two representative causes of action, one based 
on fraudulent representation or false warranties; the 
other based on allegations that defendant as record 
holder of the mortgage securing the certificates held by 
the plaintiffs and other fraudulently extended them 
mortgage. The court held that the first cause of action 
was not maintainable as a class suit but the second cause 
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12 
of action was so maintainable because of the oom'munity 
of interest with respect to the mortgag·e. 
In the same note is cited Mickelson v. Penny, 10 Fed. 
Sup. 537, an interesting and instructive case;, holding 
that depositors in a failed bank could not maintain a 
class suit against a director for false representations as 
to solvency; yet they could maintain a class suit in the 
nature of a creditor's bill against the director for and 
on account of the wrongs done to the bank. 
So here can the plaintiffs maintain a class suit in 
respect of the wrongful diversions of the assets to the 
Colonial Corporation, and in this aspect it is immaterial 
as to exactly what their status is as long as their status 
is in the nature of a claim to an interest in the fund. 
Counsel lean heavily on Lindem Land Co. v. Mil-
waukee Railroad, etc. Co. (Wis.) 83 N.W. 851. That case 
had a double aspect. Plaintiffs there sought to maintain 
a class suit in behalf of themselves and others similarly 
situated as taxpayers. The court held the class suit 
proper but that no cause of action was stated in right 
of taxpayers as such. 
In the .3ame case a class suit was attempted in be-
half of plaintiff and others as abutters on the miles of 
street railroad. The court correctly held as a matter of 
fact that in the nature of things abutters on a long line 
of street railroad would have essentially dissimilar inter-
est and could not be similarly situated, and the court 
therefore concluded that one abutter could not represent 
other abutters. The case was properly decided. Also 
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it is absolutely pointless here as aiding the defendants. 
In this connection counsel seek to buttress their 
demurrer by den)ing the allegations of insolvency. 
Counsel should rernernber that demurrers should not 
'"shout" and that the denlUITant adrnits the truth of the 
facts stated in the con1plaint. 
It is suggested that some stockholders might not 
desire the relief sought by this complaint. Very well, 
they do not have to con1e in to the suit but merely have 
a right to r.orne in. This is not a derivative suit, purely 
in right of the corporation building and loan association. 
There is a "'ide difference between a purely derivative 
suit and a representative suit in right of the plaintiffs 
and others similarly situated as individuals. See 4 Cook 
on Corporations, P. 3294; Dana v. Morgan, 232 Fed. 85; 
Wabash R. Co. v. Adelbert College, 208 U. S. 38, 57, 58; 
52 L. 379, at 388. 
At page 21 counsel say "the association is made 
both a plaintiff and a defendant.'' This is not strictly 
accurate, but if it were then counsel have stultified them-
selves (and worse), by general appearances for both the 
association and the Colonial Corporation. Have counsel 
forgotten that no man can serve two masters. Do they 
not know that they cannot with propriety or legality for 
the association contend that the Colonial Corporation has 
a right to receive on its commo n stock funds equitably 
belonging to the investors in the association. The very 
appearance of same counsel for both coporate defend-
ants is strictly in accord with the allegations of the 
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complaint as to the general conspiracy and wrongs of 
the defendants. 
Counsel cite Blake v. Boston Development Co., 50 
(Utah) 347, 167, P. 672. There several causes of action 
were alleged personal to the plaintiff and directly against 
the corporation to cancel stock assessments. Also a 
purely derivative cause of action in right of the corpor-
ation against certain directors and officers. There was 
no connection stated between the different kinds of 
causes of action and the one in no wise depended upon 
the other. 
Here the cause of action against the association to 
be reinstated as a stockholder of record is connected 
directly by reason of insolvency, etc., with the cause of 
action against the Colonial to set aside the fraudulent 
conveyance and the latter matter is dependent upon the 
first. Furthermore, such matter is not within the reason 
or doctrine of purely derivative stockholders suits, not-
withstanding in ultimate principle they are in some 
respects analagous. 
At page 26 various cases are cited on questions of 
misjoinder. The Ballew Lumber, etc., case was a suit 
in equity (on law causes of action) by several independ-
ent shippers to recover separate overcharges from the 
railroad company. The court said that they were merely 
law actions but intimated that if the claims had been 
severally cognizable in equity the joinder would be 
proper. 
In the Rural Credit, etc., case the court held that a 
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cause of artion against a corporation for cancellation 
was not joinable with a cause of action for damages 
against individuals. 
In Stewart Y. Ficken, 1-19 S.E. 164 (S. C.), there was 
an attempt to join a law action by a depositor of a bank 
to recoYer his deposit with a cause of action in right of 
the bank not dependent on the first cause of action and 
a cause of action in another plaintiff as trustee. No com-
munity of interest or connection appeared. 
In the Spear case fr01n :Massachusetts there were 
about fortJ? pliantiffs comprising seven distinct groups 
of plaintiffs ·with different interest and there were three 
distinct corporation defendants. The court properly said 
''there is no community of interest on the part of these 
~everal classes'' and they are ''not sufficiently bound 
together by allegations of fraud and conspiracy to render 
them appropriate matters for inquiry in a single suit." 
At page 24 counsel say ''the causes of action for 
an accounting and to set aside the claimed fraudulent 
conveyance to Colonial Corporation as alleged could of 
course b~ only derivative." There is no cause of action 
stated for an accounting any more than there is a cause 
of action stated for receivership. Such matters are an-
cillary and preliminary in their nature. Furthermore, 
no case holds that a suit to set aside a fraudulent con-
veyance is derivative. 
The allegations in paragraph 16 of the complaint 
with respect to diversion from the treasury of money for 
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excessive salaries does not purport to state a separate 
cause of action but are matters of inducement rather, 
and indeed may be surplusage and vulnerable to a mo-
tion to strike. 
But the claimed defect was not specifically pointed 
out in the demurrer for misjoinder of causes of action. 
That ground, No. 11 (Record 26), merely asserts a 
misjoinder of causes, describing no separate causes of 
action, except by the adjective "respective" and then 
referring to the matter of receivership as a distinct 
cause of action and the matter of liquidation and distri-
bution as a cause of action and the matter of accounting 
as a separate cause of action. No suggestion is made 
that would in any wise indicate to the plaintiffs wherein 
any misjoinder consisted, and the statute as we have 
heretofore pointed out requires a particular specification 
in a special demurrer. ''A general averment to the 
effect that causes of action have been improperly joined 
is insufficient.'' 
1 Chitty on Pleading 447. 49 C.J. 237. 
A special demurrer under the code with respect to 
misjoinder is in the nature of a plea in abatement at 
common law and the defent must be so pointed out as 
to ''give the plaintiff a better writ.'' See also Gould on 
Pleading, 249-250 and 446. 
Were it not for the fact that a demurrer does not 
lie to a demurrer we might well have demurred to the 
demurrer for uncertainty. 
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UNCERTAINTY 
Counsel achnit, as they must, on page 27, the ap-
positeness of our authorities touching the pleading of 
discoYery of the fraud. They cite 37 C.J. 1200. From 
that authority we glean that under the old equity prac-
tiee the con1plainant nn1st generally anticipate a defense 
and aYoid it. Also that under the codes it is not neces-
sary to anticipate a plea of the statute, except that where 
the li1nitation is one which goes to the right of action 
-itself it is someti1nes necessary to anticipate and avoid. 
In Hatch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 116, at page 129, this 
court makes son1e useful comment on the distinction be-
tween the State and Federal courts with respect to mat-
ters of limitation and laches. 
State courts sometimes cite Federal cases as persu-
asive or controlling without noticing some fundamental 
principles. 
C.J. cites many cases and various conflicting hold-
ings on the general question of pleading when the stat-
ute of limitation is involved. 
The same may be said of 34 Am. Jur., Sec. 425. 
4 Sutherland Code Pleading cites a single case in sup-
port of its text, namely, Sterns v. Page, 7 How. 819, 
12 L. 928, which case holds that a bill in equity in a fraud 
suit must anticipate the defense and show as an integral 
part of the cause of action all the circumstances con-
nected with the matter of fraud and its discovery. 
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135, 25 L. 807, In-
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volved an Indiana statute quite unlike our own. There 
the statute would be tolled by an affirmative act of the 
defendant in concealing the existence of the cause of 
action. Naturally enough the plaintiff might be required 
to allege all the facts with respect to the concealment 
and as a part of that the time and circumstances of plain-
tiff's discovery. 
Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 U. S. 547, 38 L. 548, was 
a suit in equity where plaintiff was required to anticipate 
the defense, and in order to show equity was required 
to set forth specifically all matters connected with the 
fraud and its discovery. Mr. Justice Brewer who wrote 
the opinion was the same judge who wrote the opinion 
in the case we cited, K. P. Railroad v. McCormick, 20 
Kan. 107. He. was not inconsistent, but he recognized 
that the principles of the high court of chancery were 
different from an explicit State statute. 
Counsel also cite Lady Washington, etc., Co. v. Wood 
(Cal.) 45, P. 809. That case seems to support counsel's 
contention. It was participated in by three judges. 
A contrary holding of the same court was made in 
Loftis v. Marshall, 66, P. 571, where the court adopted 
the opinion of commissioner George H. Smith, concur-
red in by Haynes, commissioner, and Cooper, commis-
sioner. Commissioner Smith was noted for his learning. 
He was a judge at one time of a district court of appeal 
in California and was the author of numerous excellent 
works. 
The case of Teats v. Caldwell (Cal. App.) 151, P. 
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973, also holds that the general allegation substantially 
as we make it is sufficient. 
~-\t page :11 of the brief it is argued that if any 
ground of the deunurer is held to be correct the order 
sustaining it should be affinned. 
If counsel n1ean by that that the judgment should 
be affirn1ed, in such event, then we say that such result 
should not follow. It is our position that if we have 
shown substantial and prejudicial error in the ruling, 
then this court should reverse such ruling and to that 
end should reverse the judgment. Otherwise manifest 
injustice would result to the plaintiffs and we submit 
that in modern times courts should endeavor within the 
limits of their power to effectuate justice. In many juris-
dictions a party may appeal from an order sustaining 
a demurrer, and in such a case the court will reverse 
the order insofar as it is found to be erroneous. In 
this jurisdiction we assume that the order overruling 
the remurrer is not itself appealable, but we insist that 
the order in every respect is subject to review on appeal 
from the judgment, and if substantial error is found in 
the ruling then the court should so hold and make its 
holding effective and fruitful. It appears to be the posi-
tion of counsel from the last two pages of the brief that 
they seek an unholy advantage in the event that some 
ruling in their favor may be right, unless all are held 
to be wrong. Sometimes such results follow, but it is 
deplorable that they should in any court. 
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Again we respectfully submit that the appeal is 
meritorious and that the judgment should be reversed. 
R. LESLIE HEDRICK AND 
E. A. WALTON, 
Attorneys for A.ppella;nts. 
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